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I. INTRODUCTION
Low- and middle-income Americans benefit little from recent
developments in trust laws enabling the wealthy to shelter assets
from creditors. Many foreign nations allow Americans to establish
asset protection trusts abroad, purportedly making it impossible for
American creditors to collect from American debtors. While
bankruptcy courts rarely face cases involving these foreign trusts,
the few cases on point have been decided unanimously against the
debtors on public policy grounds. Not to be outdone, several
American states have now modified their trust laws to compete with
foreign nations. These recent amendments facilitate continued social
stratification by discouraging wealthy debtors from repaying their

∗ J.D., Florida State University, 2001; M.B.A., Clemson University, 1994; B.S.,
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977

978

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:977

debts even when they have the ability to do so. The unresolved
question is how bankruptcy courts will treat those trusts.
Federal courts have exclusive and original jurisdiction over
property of a bankruptcy estate.1 The Bankruptcy Code defines
property of the estate as “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor
in property as of the commencement of the case.”2 The Supreme
Court affirmed the breadth of this definition in United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc.3 Ordinarily, even nontransferable property is
included in the estate.4 However, there is an exception to that broad
definition where “a restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest
of the debtor in a trust [ ] is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy
law.”5
Under
those
circumstances,
the
6
nontransferable interest is not included in the estate. The
unanswered question explored in this Comment is the extent to
which recently enacted state laws validating self-settled spendthrift
trusts prevent inclusion of trust assets in the bankruptcy estate.
Part II briefly describes self-settled spendthrift trusts, and Part
III illustrates the issues they create in bankruptcy using previously
decided cases involving offshore trusts. Part IV then offers an
overview of the recently enacted state laws making these trusts
enforceable, describing the statutes and the motives underlying their
passage. Parts V and VI outline a number of ways bankruptcy courts
and trustees might safeguard the purposes and spirit of the
bankruptcy laws by bringing the assets of these trusts into the
bankruptcy estate, or how they might otherwise deny self-settlors the
“head start” they are trying to gain by exploiting the bankruptcy
laws. Part VII then describes how this loophole came to be in the law,
noting in particular that it was unintended and is in need of repair.
Finally, Part VIII concludes that allowing bankruptcy debtors to
keep their assets out of the bankruptcy estate in this manner is
offensive to the bankruptcy code’s purpose of providing a fresh start
to debtors and creates a serious inequity that should not be tolerated.
While there are mechanisms that allow the judiciary to mitigate the
situation, only Congress can provide a fully satisfactory solution.
Congress should assume responsibility for closing this unforeseen
loophole rather than leaving such an important issue to the vagaries
of judicial interpretation.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994).
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
462 U.S. 198, 209 (1983).
See § 541(c)(1).
Id. § 541(c)(2).
See id.

2001]

SELF-SETTLED SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS

979

II. SELF-SETTLED SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS DEFINED
Suppose a parent makes a gift of money to a child. If the gift is a
lump sum, the child can spend it as she chooses. If the gift is a
stream of payments (an annuity), the child can sell the income
stream for its present value and spend the proceeds as she chooses.
In either case, the child’s access to funds means that the child’s
creditors can levy against the gift.7 Using a spendthrift trust,
however, a parent can gift to a child while ensuring that the child
cannot alienate her interest in the trust and, consequently, that
creditors cannot reach her interest.8
When a settlor creates a trust for his own benefit, it is said to be
“self-settled.”9 The common law rule, followed by the vast majority of
American jurisdictions, is that a self-settled trust is ineffective
against the claims of creditors.10 Nevertheless, exceptions do exist.
For example, creditors cannot reach a debtor’s interest in an ERISAqualified pension plan in bankruptcy, because federal law makes
such an interest inalienable.11 There may be an exception for the
spendthrift clauses of overseas military personnel where they do not
take effect unless the settlor is captured by hostile forces.12 Similarly,
spendthrift clauses created by corporate executives and taking effect
only if the executives are kidnapped by individuals seeking ransom
may be enforceable as well.13 Finally, it is unclear whether indirectly
self-settled spendthrift trusts are permissible.14
7. See ROGER W. ANDERSEN, UNDERSTANDING TRUSTS AND ESTATES 113 (2d ed.
1999) (“[C]reditors’ rights typically follow alienability: the creditor usually can get what
the beneficiary can transfer.”).
8. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
631 (5th ed. 1995). Dukeminier and Johanson offer the following example of a spendthrift
clause:
[The beneficiary is] restrained from alienating, anticipating, encumbering, or in
any manner assigning his or her interest or estate, either in principal or
income, and is without power so to do, nor shall such interest or estate be
subject to his or her liabilities or obligations nor to judgment or other legal
process, bankruptcy proceedings or claims of creditors or others.
Id. at 633 (quoting Shelley v. Shelley, 354 P.2d 282 (Or. 1960)).
9. See, e.g., Sattin v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 217 B.R. 98, passim (Bankr. D. Conn.
1998) (using the term repeatedly).
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(1) (1959)).
11. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 760 (1992) (holding that “applicable
nonbankruptcy law” includes both federal and state law).
12. See ASSET PROTECTION: LEGAL PLANNING & STRATEGIES ¶ 6.08[3] (1999)
[hereinafter ASSET PROTECTION].
13. See id.
14. See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and
Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 5 (1995) (stating that the case law fails to
resolve conclusively whether a structured settlement of a tort claim wherein the tortfeasor
creates a spendthrift trust for the victim falls into this category). But see ASSET
PROTECTION, supra note 12, at ¶ 6.08[1] (asserting that funding an irrevocable spendthrift
trust with the proceeds of a personal injury recovery subjects trust to creditor attachment).

980

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:977

III. OFFSHORE SELF-SETTLED SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS IN BANKRUPTCY
Americans use offshore trusts to prevent creditors from forcing
the repatriation of assets to the United States. Many foreign
jurisdictions such as Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Cook Islands,
Jersey, and Nevis allow foreigners to shield their assets from
creditors through self-settled spendthrift trusts.15 The ability of
Americans to ensure complete asset protection, however, depends on
the laws of the applicable jurisdiction. Thus, some understanding of
the procedure one would follow to transform vulnerable assets into
protected assets is necessary to understand the issues that arise in
bankruptcy cases involving offshore self-settled trusts.
A. Creating the Offshore Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust
FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC,16 a nonbankruptcy case from the
Ninth Circuit, illustrates an American couple’s failed attempt to
insulate themselves from liability by safeguarding assets through an
offshore asset protection trust. An American husband and wife selfsettled an asset-protection trust in the Cook Islands.17 They then
transferred their assets to their offshore trust.18 They named
themselves “protectors,” giving themselves the power to oversee the
foreign trustees and veto the trustees’ actions as necessary.19 The
trust included a provision requiring the foreign trustees to refuse to
repatriate the trust assets when the settlors experienced an event of
“duress.”20 Under the duress provision, the foreign trustees would
acquire exclusive control of the trust if a court in the United States
were to issue an order against the settlors.21
15. See John E. Sullivan III, Gutting the Rule Against Self-Settled Trusts: How the
New Delaware Trust Law Competes with Offshore Trusts, 23 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 423, 439
(1998); see also Sattin v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 217 B.R. 98, 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998)
(citing Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 32-33 (1996)).
16. 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).
17. See id. at 1231.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 1243.
20. Id. at 1240 n.9 (quoting the trust agreement). The trust defines “duress” to
include the following:
“the issuance of any order, decree or judgment of any court or tribunal in any
part of the world which in the opinion of the protector will or may directly or
indirectly, expropriate, sequester, levy, lien or in any way control, restrict or
prevent the free disposal by a trustee of any monies, investments or property
which may from time to time be included in or form part of this trust and any
distributions therefrom.”
Id. (quoting the trust agreement).
21. See id. The trust provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision contained in this deed any trustee hereof
shall automatically cease to be a trustee upon the happening of an event of
duress within the territory where such trustee is . . . resident (in the case of an
individual) and upon ceasing to be a trustee pursuant to this clause such
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Since the foreign trustees were beyond the jurisdiction of a United
States court, the only entities within the court’s jurisdiction were the
settlors.22 The district court circumvented this problem by ordering
the settlors to repatriate the assets; the court then found them in
civil contempt for failing to comply with its order.23 The settlors
protested, arguing that they could not comply and that impossibility
of performance is a defense to civil contempt.24 But the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, stating that “[i]n the asset protection trust context . . . the
burden on the party asserting an impossibility defense will be
particularly high because of the likelihood that any attempted
compliance with the court’s orders will be merely a charade rather
than a good faith effort to comply.”25
B. Choice of Law and Public Policy
In In re Brooks,26 a bankruptcy court sitting in Connecticut faced
the question whether funds held in offshore trusts were property of
the estate under section 541(a) or were excluded from the estate
under section 541(c)(2).27 The bankruptcy trustee argued that
because the offshore trusts were self-settled and therefore
unenforceable, they were property of the estate.28 The debtor
countered that the trusts were not in fact self-settled, and so could be
excepted from the estate under 541(c)(2) as enforceable spendthrift
trusts.29 Before addressing whether the trusts were self-settled, the
Brooks court commenced a choice-of-law analysis to determine which
jurisdiction’s law constituted the “applicable nonbankruptcy law” for
purposes of determining whether self-settled trusts would be
enforceable.30

trustee shall be divested of title to the property of this trust which shall
automatically vest in the remaining or continuing trustee (if any) located in a
territory not having an event of duress and the form for administration of this
trust shall notwithstanding any other provision in this deed be deemed to be the
place of residence or incorporation (if a corporation) of such continuing trustee.
Id. (quoting the trust agreement).
22. See FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1999).
23. See id. at 1232-33.
24. See id. at 1240 (citing United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983)).
25. Id. at 1241. Even if the settlors had resigned from their position as protectors, the
court might still have found them in control of the trust. The court did not decide the issue
because the settlors conceded they were protectors of the trust. See id. at 1243.
26. 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).
27. Id. at 100.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 100, 102. The debtor transferred stock certificates to his wife, who then
traveled to Bermuda and Jersey to establish the trusts. She was the one to actually
transfer the assets to the trusts. See id. at 101.
30. Id. at 101. The trusts contained choice-of-law provisions providing that the law of
the respective foreign countries would apply for purposes of interpreting the trust, but the
debtor (as well as his wife) was domiciled in Connecticut. See id.
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The parties agreed that the choice-of-law rules of Connecticut
were applicable, in accordance with the general rule to apply the rule
of the forum.31 The court noted that the general rule under
Connecticut’s choice-of-law rules is to respect the expressed intent of
the settlor as to which jurisdiction’s law will govern the trust.32
Nonetheless, as the court noted, there are two exceptions to this
general rule. First, the validity of a trust in personal property is
determined by the law of the settlor’s domicile.33 Second, Connecticut
courts will not enforce the law of another jurisdiction that violates
the public policy of Connecticut.34 In the case at hand, the settlors
were domiciled in Connecticut and the trusts consisted of personal
property (stock certificates).35 Consequently, the bankruptcy court
applied Connecticut trust law rather than the foreign law designated
in the trust documents.36
In discussing Connecticut’s substantive law, the court stressed
why the Connecticut Supreme Court had held self-settled trusts
unenforceable. Enforcing these kinds of trusts, Connecticut’s high
court had explained, would violate public policy by “open[ing] too
wide an opportunity for a man to evade his just debts to be
permissible unless sanctioned by statutory enactment.”37 Ultimately,
having earlier found the trusts to be self-settled, the court
determined the trusts were not enforceable under Connecticut law.38
C. The “Common Sense” Rationale and Inalienability
One bankruptcy court was recently persuaded by the “common
sense” rationale of Affordable Media.39 In re Lawrence,40 a 1999
opinion from the Southern District of Florida, underscores the point

31. See id. at 101 (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97
(1941), which extended Erie to the field of conflict-of-law analysis). But see infra Part V.A
(pointing out that bankruptcy courts may use federal common law choice-of-law rules
instead of the forum’s).
32. See In re Brooks, 217 B.R. at 101; accord Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re
Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 267 (1971)).
33. See In re Brooks, 217 B.R. at 101.
34. See id.; accord In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 697 (applying New York and federal
common law choice-of-law rules); accord Dzikowski v. Edmonds (In re Cameron), 223 B.R.
20 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998) (applying New York law).
35. See In re Brooks 217 B.R 98.
36. See id.
37. In re Brooks, 217 B.R. at 104 (quoting Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 37 A.2d 166,
171 (Conn. 1942)); accord In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 685, 698. The Portnoy court went even
further, stating, “It is not at all clear what the policy behind the Jersey amendment is
except, perhaps, to augment business.” Id. at 700.
38. See In re Brooks, 217 B.R. at 104.
39. FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999); see also supra Part
III.A.
40. Goldberg v. Lawrence (In re Lawrence), 238 B.R. 498 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999).
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that a settlor who retains the power to change the trustee of an
overseas trust also retains the power to have a trustee repatriate the
trust corpus to the United States.41 In that case, the settlor was a
Chapter 7 debtor under attack by a bankruptcy trustee.42 According
to the Lawrence court:
[I]t defies reason—it tortures reason—to accept and believe that
this Debtor transferred over $7,000,000 in 1991, an amount then
constituting over ninety percent of his liquid net worth, to a trust
in a far away place administered by a stranger—pursuant to an
Alleged Trust which purports to allow the trustee of the Alleged
Trust total discretion over the administration and distribution of
the trust res. The Court declines to abandon common sense and to
torture reason in the manner urged by the debtor.43

In other words, pure common sense dictates that no rational person
would irrevocably transfer all or nearly all of his assets and not
retain some mechanism to reacquire them. The bankruptcy court
found the settlor in civil contempt for failing to repatriate the trust
corpus, giving the settlor thirteen days to repatriate the trust corpus
and fining him $10,000 each day until repatriation occurred.44 If the
settlor failed to repatriate the corpus within thirteen days, he would
be incarcerated until he purged his contempt.45
D. Summary
The common sense approach to offshore trusts in bankruptcy can
achieve desirable results where, as in Lawrence, courts find that
debtors have the ability to repatriate assets. Choice-of-law analysis
may also allow the court to defeat the unjustified expectations of a
self-settlor of an offshore trust who files for bankruptcy. But whether
the courts engage in choice of law analysis or use common sense,
debtors find themselves in contempt of court when they fail to comply
with court orders mandating repatriation. As evidenced by Lawrence,
civil contempt may lead to substantial monetary fines or
incarceration. Few (if any) debtors choose to serve as martyrs to their
offshore trusts: instead, the limited case law suggests that debtors
eventually comply with court orders—“they hold the keys to their
own cells.”46 In essence, bankruptcy courts have implicitly held that

41. See id. at 500 (citing Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1228, 1240); see also In re
Lawrence, 227 B.R. 907, aff’d, 251 B.R. 630 (holding that self-settled trusts violate public
policy).
42. See In re Lawrence, 238 B.R. 498.
43. In re Lawrence, 238 B.R. at 500 (footnote omitted).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 38.
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offshore self-settled trusts are not “enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.”
IV. THE ADVENT OF THE ONSHORE SELF-SETTLED
SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
Bankruptcy courts coerce settlors into retrieving assets from
offshore self-settled trusts with relative ease. The bankruptcy courts
are presumably insulated from the politics and pressures of offshore
jurisdictions. Recently, however, the legislatures of a number of
American states have enacted various laws recognizing the
effectiveness of self-settled spendthrift trusts. This creates a more
difficult question for the bankruptcy courts: whether onshore asset
protection trusts are “enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy
law.” Before addressing this issue, however, it is helpful first to
examine this recent legislation.
A. State Legislation
1. Alaska
The Alaska Trust Act became effective in 1997.47 The statute
recognizes the effectiveness of self-settled spendthrift trusts with
four important exceptions.48 First, creditors may generally pursue
fraudulent transfers into these trusts that are made within four
years of the creation of the trust.49 Second, the trust will not defeat
the claims of a creditor if the settlor may “revoke” or “terminate” all
or part of the trust against the wishes of a beneficiary.50 Third, the
transfer will not defeat a creditor’s claim if the trust requires that all
or part of the trust’s income and/or principal must be distributed to
47. SLA 1997, Ch. 6 (H.B. 101); see also Alan S. Gassman & James F. Gulecas, Alaska
Spawns a New Trust: Alaskan and Other Asset Protection Trusts, 13 THE PRACTICAL TAX
LAW. 25, 28 (1998).
48. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b) (Michie 1997). The statute provides, “If a trust
contains a transfer restriction allowed under [section] (a) of this section, the transfer
restriction prevents a creditor existing when the trust is created, a person who
subsequently becomes a creditor, or another person from satisfying a claim out of the
beneficiary’s interest in the trust . . . .” Id.
49. See id.; see also § 34.40.110(d). Section 34.40.100(d) states:
A cause of action or claim for relief with respect to a fraudulent transfer under
(b)(1) of this section, or under other law, is extinguished unless the action is
brought as to a person who
(1) is a creditor when the trust is created, within the later of
(A) four years after the transfer is made; or
(B) one year after the transfer is or reasonably could have been discovered by
the person; or
2) becomes a creditor subsequent to the transfer into trust, within four years
after the transfer is made.
Id.
50. See id. § 34.40.110(b)(2).
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the settlor.51 Hence, this third exception permits only discretionary
self-settled trusts; creditors can reach mandatory distributions to a
settlor who doubles as beneficiary. Finally, the transfer will not be
upheld in Alaska if, at the time of the transfer, the settlor is thirty or
more days late in making a child support payment.52
The second exception is a particularly significant one: the words
“revoke” and “terminate” do “not include a power to veto a
distribution from the trust.”53 Yet the power to veto a distribution
represents significant power over the trust assets. The exercise of
such power is clearly unfair to creditors—a debtor retaining the
power to veto a distribution from his own self-settled spendthrift
trust should be required to repay his creditors.
2. Delaware and Rhode Island
Delaware also enacted legislation in 1997, the Qualified
Dispositions in Trust Act,54 making enforceable self-settled
spendthrift trusts.55 Rhode Island enacted legislation almost
identical to Delaware’s in 1999.56 Two features make Delaware and
Rhode Island trusts “clearly inferior to the Alaska trust” (from the
settlor’s perspective).57 First, in both Delaware and Rhode Island,
persons entitled to spousal or child support can pierce a self-settled
trust to the extent of the debt owed.58 Second, in both Delaware and
Rhode Island, persons who suffer wrongful death, personal injury, or
property damage on or before the date of the transfer can pierce the
trust.59 Delaware law also provides that a trust instrument otherwise
conforming to the Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act “shall be
deemed to be a restriction on the transfer of the transferor’s
beneficial interest in the trust that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law within the meaning of § 541(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code . . . or any successor provision thereto.”60 Clearly,
the Delaware legislature was well aware of the potential impact of
51. See § 34.40.110(b)(3).
52. See § 34.40.110(b)(4).
53. Id. § 34.40.110(b)(2).
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3574(a) (1997).
55. See Gassman & Gulecas, supra note 47, at 34. But cf. Sullivan, supra note 15, at
446. Mr. Sullivan argues that debtors hope it is cost-prohibitive for creditors to sue because
the statute provides that a general creditor can avoid a transfer into trust “only to the
extent necessary to satisfy the transferor’s debt to the creditor at whose instance the
disposition had been avoided.” Id. (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3574(a) (1997)).
56. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-9.2-2, 18-9.2-4, 18-9.2-5, 18-4-27 (1999) (amended 2000).
57. Gassman & Gulecas, supra note 47, at 35.
58. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3573(1) (1999).
59. See § 3573(2). This includes vicarious liability claims. The unfortunate corollary to
this provision is that post-transfer involuntary tort victims cannot defeat debtor’s selfsettled spendthrift trust.
60. Id. § 3570(9)(c).
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the Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act in bankruptcy, where state
trust law is incorporated by reference into the Bankruptcy Code.
3. Nevada
Nevada’s legislature enacted the Spendthrift Trust Act in 1999.61
Like the recent changes to the trusts laws of Alaska, Delaware, and
Rhode Island, the essence of the legislation is to generally enforce
self-settled spendthrift trusts except in the case of fraudulent
transfers.62 Nevada’s legislation is especially unsympathetic to
federalism concerns: it expressly requires trustees of spendthrift
trusts to ignore bankruptcy court orders seeking the turnover of trust
assets.63 The key difference between Nevada’s legislation and that of
Alaska and Delaware is that Nevada abandoned the interests of
child- and spousal-support creditors, as well as involuntary tort
creditors.64 Consequently, Nevada should attract the trust business
of those individuals seeking maximum asset protection.
B. Why States Enact Anticreditor Legislation
The very provisions of some of this legislation reveal what fueled
their passage. For example, Alaska’s law provides a number of telling
conditions that must be satisfied before a choice-of-law provision in
the trust instrument will be respected. First, at least one trustee
must be an Alaskan resident, bank, or trust company with its
principal place of business in Alaska.65 Clearly, Alaskan attorneys,
banks, and trust companies have much to gain when individuals
begin to establish Alaskan trusts.66 Second, the Alaskan trustee is
responsible for maintaining trust records or preparing the trust
income tax return.67 Obviously, Alaskan accountants are also hoping
for a boost in business. Third, assets must be deposited in Alaska and
administered by the Alaskan trustee.68 Again, Alaska’s financial
institutions stand to gain. Finally, part of the trust administration
must take place in Alaska.69
61. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.010 (1999).
62. See id. § 166.040(1)(b).
63. See id. § 166.120(2).
64. See id. § 166.090(1) (“Provision for the beneficiary will be for the support,
education, maintenance and benefit of the beneficiary alone, and without reference to or
limitation by his needs, station in life, or mode of life, or the needs of any other person,
whether dependent upon him or not.”(emphasis added)).
65. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.36.035(c), 13.36.390 (Michie 1997).
66. See Gideon Rothschild et al., Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts: Should a Few Bad
Apples Spoil the Bunch?, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 763, 777 (1999) (conceding that “some
consideration” must be given to the goal of keeping trust capital and business in the
United States).
67. See § 13.36.035(c).
68. See id.
69. See id.

2001]

SELF-SETTLED SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS

987

Indeed, the bill’s sponsor described the Alaska Trust Act as a
result of his desire to stimulate economic development in Alaska and
to make it more of a financial center for the world.70 Hence, the
Alaskan legislature created jobs for Alaskans (and a greater tax base
for itself!). Unfortunately, such jobs were created at the expense of
creditors.71 It will be no great surprise to see more states pass similar
legislation to fend off capital flight and job losses.
V. BRINGING ONSHORE SELF-SETTLED SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS INTO
THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
Thus far, no bankruptcy court has decided whether a domestic
self-settled spendthrift trust constitutes property of the bankruptcy
estate. The impenetrable protection onshore self-settled trusts
purportedly provide makes it inevitable that such cases will arise in
the near future. These cases implicate complex issues of federalism
and conflict of laws. As noted above, section 541(c)(2) of the Code
provides that “[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of
the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.”72
On the one hand, bankruptcy judges could simply construe the
meaning of “applicable nonbankruptcy law” to mean state trust law,
find the transfer restrictions of self-settled spendthrifts enforceable,
and thereby protect these assets from creditor attack. But there are
several alternatives to this unattractive prospect. First, because at
least some of the creditors are likely to be from a state other than the
one where the trust was created—as the settlor will also often be—
the judge may determine that the “applicable” law is that of a state
that does not enforce these types of trusts. Second, even where all the
parties and the trust reside in a state enforcing these trusts, the
judge may find that transfer is not truly restricted, because the
settlor has retained control and dominion over the property—in a
sense ruling that federal bankruptcy policy is the “applicable law”
here. Finally, the bankruptcy trustee could assume the interest,
rights, and powers of the debtor—causing the trustee to turn over the
assets.

70. See Trusts & Property Transfers in Trusts: Hearing on H.B. 101 Before the House
Labor and Commerce Comm., 20th Legis., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1997) (statement of Al Vezey,
Representative), Alaska State Legislature Textual Infobases, http://www.legis.state.ak.us/
Folhome.htm (Search of 20th Legislature Committee Minutes).
71. The Delaware Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act is essentially job-creation
legislation as well. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(c)(8) (1999).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
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A. Conflict of Law Issues: Finding the “Applicable
Nonbankruptcy Law”
The first question a bankruptcy court faces is this: What
nonbankruptcy law is applicable to determine whether the trust is
enforceable?73 Consider a case where the debtor, a continuous
resident of State X for many years, self-settled an Alaskan trust
years ago. In addition, suppose the creditors are all from State X.
State X does not enforce self-settled spendthrift trusts. The question
for the bankruptcy court will ultimately be whether the intent of the
settlor (retention of assets) outweighs the public policy of State X
(prohibition against self-settled spendthrift trusts).
Because bankruptcy cases are not diversity cases, the bankruptcy
court is not required to apply local choice-of-law rules.74 Nonetheless,
“a number of courts have suggested that, when the issue before a
bankruptcy court is the scope of a state-created right, the bankruptcy
court should look to the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the
court sits.”75 Even this approach, however, permits the bankruptcy
court to displace local choice-of-law rules when “important concerns
implicating national bankruptcy policy are implicated”76 or “where
there is a compelling federal interest.”77 Deciding whether to enforce
self-settled spendthrift trusts in bankruptcy easily triggers and
fulfills the requirements of these tests, allowing the court to apply
federal common law choice-of-law rules.
Under federal common law choice-of-law rules, the substantive
law to be applied is that “of the jurisdiction having the greatest
interest in the litigation.”78 Significantly, a choice-of-law provision
contained in the trust is not solely determinative of whose law will
dictate whether the trust is valid.79 While the intent of the settlor is
an important factor, it cannot override important public policy
concerns of an interested state.80 This includes the creditors’ states; it

73. Cf. Sattin v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).
74. See Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 697 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the
Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1117 n.359 (2000).
75. Sterk, supra note 74, at 1117 n.359; see also In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 697
76. Sterk, supra note 74, at 1117 n. 359 (quoting Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v.
Refco F/X Assocs. (In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.), 961 F.2d 341, 350-51 (2d Cir.
1992)).
77. Sterk, supra note 74, at 1117 n.359 (quoting Compliance Marine, Inc. v. Campbell
(In re Merritt Dredging Co. v. Campbell), 839 F.2d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1998)).
78. In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 685, 697.
79. See id. at 697-98.
80. See id. The Restatement describes the rule this way:
The chief purpose in making decisions as to the applicable law is to carry out
the intention of the creator of the trust in the disposal of the trust property. It
is important that his intention, to the extent to which it can be ascertained,
should not be defeated, unless this is required by the policy of a state which has
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also includes the United States.81 That is, the judge may choose not
to apply the law of the state that enforces these trusts because it
would offend federal bankruptcy policy to do so. Instead, the law of
the creditors’ state (or the settlor’s domicile) would apply, rendering
the trust unenforceable.
One of the primary purposes of bankruptcy is to “relieve the
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and
permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.”82 This
purpose has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being
of public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor who surrenders his property for distribution a
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.
The Supreme Court has long stressed the importance of achieving
the fresh start and once went so far as to insist that “[l]ocal rules
subversive of that result cannot be accepted as controlling the action
of a federal court.”83
It is not difficult to see how self-settled spendthrifts undermine
federal bankruptcy policy. As one federal judge has explained:
[I]t probably goes without saying that it would offend our policies
to permit a debtor to shield from creditors all of his assets because
ownership is technically held in a self-settled trust, where the
settlor/beneficiary nonetheless retains control over the assets and
may effectively direct disposition of those assets.84

Respecting these trusts would give debtors not only a fresh start, the
goal of the bankruptcy law, but a head start. Bankruptcy is designed
for people who need it, not for people who find clever ways to make
millions of dollars appear inaccessible to themselves. This kind of
affront to public policy should allow a bankruptcy court to find in its
choice-of-law analysis that the right substantive law is the one that
would bring the trust into the bankruptcy estate.
Yet, choice-of-law rules are very broad and pliable—almost
unfairly whimsical. For example, the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws offers the following general factors for determining
the applicable substantive law:
such an interest in defeating his intention, as to the particular issue involved,
that its local law should be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
81. See In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 698 (“[A]pplication of Jersey’s substantive law
would offend strong New York and federal bankruptcy policies . . . .” (emphasis added)).
82. Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915) (emphasis
added).
83. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934) (emphasis added) (rejecting
Illinois law as being “destructive of the purpose and spirit of the Bankruptcy Act”).
84. In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 685, 700.
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the needs of the interstate and international systems
the relevant policies of the forum
the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interest of those states in the determination of the
particular issue
the protection of justified expectations
the basic policies underlying the particular field of law
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and
ease in determination and application of the law to be
applied.85

Bankruptcy judges could differ on this question when faced with
nearly identical facts. For example, one bankruptcy judge might
reason that the policies underlying trust law forbid a resident of
State X from protecting himself against creditors of State X by using
a self-settled trust established in state Y.86 But another bankruptcy
judge might find that a trust established pursuant to the laws of a
sister state is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Under the following approach, perhaps bankruptcy courts never need
to address the complex conflict-of-law issues that self-settled
spendthrift trusts create.
B. Using Common Sense: Defining “Restriction on the Transfer”
As a starting point, consider a bankruptcy case brought in Alaska
involving an Alaskan debtor with a self-settled Alaskan trust and
Alaskan creditors. On the one hand, the bankruptcy judge could look
to the Alaskan trust laws, find the trust enforceable under
nonbankruptcy law (Alaska state law), and preclude the creditors
from piercing the trust. Under this logic, Alaskan voters presumably
considered development of the Alaskan financial services industry
more important than the interests of Alaskan creditors when they
attended the voting polls.87 The bankruptcy judge could reason that
any changes to Alaskan trust law must originate from the Alaskan
legislature and not the federal bench.
On the other hand, a bankruptcy judge might also look to the
purpose and spirit of the bankruptcy laws. As outlined above, the
bankruptcy laws are designed to offer a fresh start—not a head start.
Permitting a debtor to obtain discharge of their debts while retaining
enjoyment of trust funds—as these few state laws would do—would
undeniably frustrate that purpose. This not only explains why these
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
86. See ASSET PROTECTION, supra note 12, at ¶ 6.08[5] (opining that self-settled
onshore trusts are vulnerable when the settlor/beneficiary is not a resident of one of the
states with trust laws permitting self-settled trusts).
87. Presumably, if the citizens of Alaska disapproved of self-settled trusts, they could
seek recourse through the Alaskan legislature.
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trust assets should not be excluded from the bankruptcy estate, it
also provides the key to including them.
By the very terms of section 541(c)(2), if the transfer of an interest
is not restricted, the statute simply does not apply. Further, as one
court has stated, “In determining whether [a trust qualifies for
exclusion from the bankruptcy estate], the overriding policies of the
Bankruptcy Code must be kept in mind . . . . Accordingly, § 541(c)(2)
must be narrowly construed to avoid impinging upon the policies
sought to be furthered by the Code.”88 Applying the Ninth Circuit’s
“common sense” rationale tells us that access to these funds will
rarely be truly restricted.89 For example, Alaska’s law allows the
settlor to keep the power to veto a distribution from the trust,90 and
settlors frequently retain the power to change the trustee.91 Part
V.C.2 below describes other significant powers retained by selfsettlors. When settlors retain this kind of control over the trust
assets, the common sense approach offers a promising way to include
these assets in the estate without wading into the complexities of
choice-of-law analysis.
C. Exercising the Powers of the Bankruptcy Trustee
1. Avoiding the Fraudulent Transfer
The bankruptcy trustee has the power to avoid certain fraudulent
transfers.92 Under some circumstances, the trustee may be able to
characterize creation of the trust as a fraudulent transfer. In that
event, the trust would effectively never have been created, and the
assets would enter the estate. However, fraudulent transfer laws of
many states probably cannot reach the assets of trusts established
more than four years before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.93
Moreover, proving a transfer fraudulent may be more difficult in
some states than in others.94 Nonetheless, fraudulent transfer law is
often an appropriate starting point.
2. Succeeding to the Settlor’s Powers
The trustee has a powerful alternative to fraudulent transfer law
as a means of bringing the trust corpus into the bankruptcy estate—
88. In re Baldwin, 142 B.R. 210, 214 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
89. See supra Part III.
90. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(2) (Michie 1997).
91. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Lawrence (In re Lawrence), 238 B.R. 498, 500 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1999).
92. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 544(b) (1994).
93. See Sterk, supra note 74, at 1044-47, for a discussion on fraudulent transfer law.
94. See id. at 1055. Proving actual fraud may be more difficult than constructive
fraud.
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the power to direct the legal and equitable interests of the debtor.
Using this approach, a self-settled spendthrift trust would remain
enforceable in form under state law. However, the bankruptcy
trustee could effectively eviscerate the trust corpus in substance by,
for example, simply changing the trustee of the trust.
a. Rhode Island and Delaware.—Rhode Island allows the settlor
of a self-settled spendthrift trust to possess the “power to revoke,
amend, alter, or modify the trust in whole or part.”95 Should the
bankruptcy trustee encounter a trust with such provision, he may
concede the trust is enforceable. Nonetheless, he may also succeed to
these interests retained by the debtor and revoke, amend, alter, or
modify the trust to bring its assets into the bankruptcy estate.96
Rhode Island also allows the settlor to “withdraw from . . . the trust
all or any part of the principal or income.”97 Thus, the bankruptcy
trustee can bring the entire principal into the estate. Finally, Rhode
Island allows the settlor to “remove the trustee or trustees and
appoint a successor trustee or trustees.”98 The Delaware trust laws
contain similar provisions.99 Hence, the bankruptcy trustee can
appoint himself or another as trustee of the self-settled spendthrift
trust who will turn over the funds to the bankruptcy estate. Selfsettled spendthrift trusts containing language providing settlors such
patently obvious control over their assets are subject to immediate
attack by bankruptcy trustees.
b. Nevada and Alaska.—In contrast, self-settled spendthrift
trusts attempting to bury the settlor’s control in hypertechnical
jargon require the bankruptcy trustee to be a little more creative. For
example, Nevada requires the self-settled spendthrift trust to be
irrevocable. Nevada and Alaska state that a trust is irrevocable
“even if the settlor may prevent a distribution from the trust or holds
a testamentary power of appointment or similar power.”100 The power
to prevent a distribution from the trust is the power to allow a
distribution from the trust. In either case, the settlor is directing the
flow of funds. Hence, it may be a “similar power.”
VI. OTHER WAYS TO DENY THE SELF-SETTLOR A “HEAD START”
If the trust assets cannot be brought into the estate, the selfsettlor might nonetheless be denied his “head start.” For example, a
bankruptcy court could deny a discharge to a debtor who has filed for
95. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-27(a)(1) (1999).
96. See Eisen v. Frangos (In re Frangos), 132 B.R. 723 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
97. § 18-4-27(a)(3).
98. Id. § 18-4-27(a)(4).
99. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(c) (1999).
100. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.040(2)(a) (Michie 1999) (emphasis added); ALASKA
STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(2) (Michie 1997) (emphasis added).
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bankruptcy yet has failed to include in her personal property
schedules her interests, rights, or powers in a self-settled spendthrift
trust. Alternatively, a bankruptcy court could dismiss a debtor’s case
for filing bankruptcy in bad faith even when that debtor lists such
information in her schedules.
A. Denial of Discharge
Debtors who file for bankruptcy protection are required to provide
the bankruptcy court with a complete picture of their financial
position.101 Such financial information enables the bankruptcy
trustee to identify and distribute assets of the bankruptcy estate. By
making a false oath in connection with or in relation to any
bankruptcy case, debtors who misrepresent their financial affairs to
the bankruptcy court may be denied a discharge and may be subject
to criminal prosecution (possibly resulting in fines and/or
imprisonment).102
One of the bankruptcy schedules (Schedule B—Personal Property)
requires debtors to identify all assets and interests including
“[e]quitable or future interests, . . . and rights or powers exercisable
for the benefit of the debtor.”103 Should the debtor who has created a
self-settled spendthrift trust fail to include her interests, rights, or
powers of such a trust in her personal property schedules, that
debtor has made a false oath. Her argument that she has no
exercisable rights or powers under the trust for her benefit must
fail.104 The court’s reasoning in cases involving self-settled
spendthrift trusts established overseas applies with equal force to
such a trust established in any one of the American states permitting
self-settled spendthrift trusts.105
The control that a debtor retains when she creates a self-settled
spendthrift trust is where the falsity of the oath may be found.
Whether she appoints herself as trustee or whether she reserves the
right to veto the decisions of a trustee she appoints, she retains some
degree of control.106 In In re Gugliada,107 the court denied a discharge
to a debtor who had inter alia knowingly and fraudulently made a
false oath or account by concealing his equitable interests in his
wife’s bank account and in a business he did not own, but over which
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
102. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) (1994); see also 18 U.S.C § 152(2) (1994).
103. Official Bankruptcy Form 18 (Schedule B-Personal Property (continuation Sheet)).
104. See supra Part III.C for further support of the argument that the debtor retains
exercisable rights or powers for her benefit.
105. See id.; supra Part V.B.
106. See Henry J. Lisher, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to liability?,
35 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 479, 525, 559 (2000) (arguing such transfers may not be
“complete”).
107. 20 B.R. 524, 534 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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he had “unfettered control.”108 The court found the debtor to have an
equitable interest in his wife’s bank account because the debtor
shielded his salary checks from creditors by depositing them in his
wife’s bank account and requesting funds from her as needed.109
Gugliada is analogous to the debtor who files for bankruptcy
protection, having previously established a self-settled spendthrift
trust; such a debtor has an equitable interest in the assets she has
transferred to a trustee from whom she is later able to receive (or
decline to veto) distributions.
The Gugliada court also found that the debtor held an equitable
interest in a company not listed in his schedules.110 Although the
debtor did not own the business, he signed checks, hired employees,
and had a free hand in making decisions and overseeing the
company’s daily affairs.111 The company was “a vehicle for the
operation of the defendant’s business.”112 Here again, Gugliada is
analogous to the debtor who files for bankruptcy, having previously
established a self-settled spendthrift trust. Such a debtor does not
“own” the trust res, but she vetoes distributions from it and appoints
its trustees. Thus, she inherently has a free hand in the
decisionmaking. In short, her trust is a vehicle for her assets.
Debtors who knowingly and fraudulently misrepresent their
financial positions to the bankruptcy court face severe consequences.
Penalties include denial of discharge, criminal fines, and
imprisonment.113 Such harsh consequences should deter debtors from
deliberately omitting their self-settled spendthrift trusts from their
bankruptcy schedules. But when debtors do neglect to include their
trust interest, the court has a powerful tool for denying them a “head
start.”
B. Dismissal of the Debtor’s Case
The harsh consequences of making a false oath suggest that a
debtor will include his interest in a self-settled spendthrift trust
somewhere in his property schedules. The bankruptcy court facing
such a debtor cannot deny him a discharge for making a false oath.
Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court could dismiss the case for filing a
bankruptcy petition in bad faith.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 534.
See id. at 531.
See id. at 533.
See id.
Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) (1994); see also 18 U.S.C § 152(2) (1994).
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Under section 707(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy
court may dismiss a case inter alia “for cause.”114 Courts disagree
over the extent to which lack of good faith is a valid basis to dismiss
a case “for cause.”115 Some courts read the statute broadly and
consider that the list of factors found in the statute is not exclusive of
other factors.116 In In re Zick, the debtor was an employee of a
company who signed a nonsolicitation agreement with the
company.117 The following year, the employee left the company.118
Shortly after, the former employee solicited the company’s former
clients.119 A court-induced mediation resulted in a $600,000 award to
the company for deliberate breach of contract.120 A few days later, the
former employee filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection.121 The
court applied the following test:
Dismissal based on lack of good faith must be undertaken on an ad
hoc basis. It should be confined carefully and is generally utilized
only in those egregious cases that entail concealed or
misrepresented assets and/or sources of income, and excessive and
continued expenditures, lavish lifestyle, and intention to avoid a
large single debt based on conduct akin to fraud, misconduct, or
gross negligence.122

Accordingly, the court dismissed the debtor’s case for lack of good
faith.
The Zick test seems applicable to the facts which are likely to
surround a self-settled spendthrift trust. The debtor would have
cleverly transferred the title to his assets and may have designated
someone else as trustee. Spendthrift trust provisions coupled with
the debtor’s power to veto distributions from the trust are akin to the
concealment of assets from creditors. In contrast, it is unlikely that
the debtor would continue to live a lavish lifestyle. Rather, he would
use his powers (for the first time?) to block distributions from the
trust to preserve his assets. By establishing a self-settled spendthrift
trust and later filing for bankruptcy protection, the debtor’s conduct
may well fall into one of the categories of fraud, misconduct, or gross
negligence. Therefore, the debtor who has established a self-settled
spendthrift trust and who seeks bankruptcy protection could find his
114. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1994) (“The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only
after notice and a hearing and only for cause . . . .”).
115. Industrial Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (6th Cir.
1991).
116. See id.
117. See id. at 1125.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 1125-26.
121. See id. at 1126.
122. Id. at 1129 (citation omitted).
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case dismissed under the Zick court’s test for a bad faith bankruptcy
filing.
In contrast to the Zick court, other bankruptcy courts concede that
the bankruptcy court may inquire into a debtor’s motivation for filing
bankruptcy, but they find that the debtor’s lack of good faith should
not turn on financial considerations.123 Instead, such courts argue
that it is not the domain of the bankruptcy court to make
“judgmental pronouncements that the debtor really should be paying
his or her debts rather than seeking refuge in bankruptcy
liquidation.”124 In In re Khan, the court sharply criticized the Zick
court and stated that inquiries into a debtor’s good faith (or lack
thereof) should be predicated upon the “debtor’s manifested attitude
toward the integrity of the bankruptcy process.”125 The Khan court’s
test was decidedly more restrictive:
[B]ad faith in the filing of a Chapter 7 petition would be evidenced
by a pervasive and orchestrated effort on the part of the debtor to
obtain the benefits of a bankruptcy filing while at the same time
intentionally and fraudulently taking action to avoid any of the
detriments. Such an effort might involve an intention to file solely
to interpose the automatic stay . . . against pending litigation or
foreclosure, without a concomitant acceptance of the statutory
duties of financial disclosure, cooperation with the trustee, and
surrender of non-exempt assets. It might also be prompted by a
vindictive motivation to use bankruptcy solely as a “scorchedearth” tactic against a pressing creditor or opponent in litigation . .
. . Of necessity, a “bad faith filing” would involve manifested
dishonesty toward a legal tribunal.126

Zick and Khan illustrate the split of authority concerning whether
lack of good faith is a valid basis for dismissal of a debtor’s
bankruptcy case. In any event, lack of good faith has been a winning
argument to “remove” a case to a state court in some circumstances.
VII. THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Neither denial of a discharge nor dismissal of the case brings the
trust corpus into the hands of creditors. Should the bankruptcy
trustee be unable to reach the assets of self-settled spendthrift trust
or to characterize the settlor’s access to funds as unrestricted, the
focus returns to the debate over the enforceability of the trusts under
123. See In re Khan, 172 B.R. 613, 622-24 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994). Later, however, the
court stated, “the Bankruptcy Court should abdicate its jurisdiction over the debtor and
the estate only if, in fact, there is no form of relief available to creditors through
bankruptcy. This would only occur if the estate contained no nonexempt assets or rights of
recovery that had any significant value . . . .” Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 624.
125. Id. at 625.
126. Id. (emphasis added)
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applicable nonbankruptcy law. The judiciary should not be placed in
the position of having to reform a statute of Congress, section
541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, because it is ambiguous as to
whether it allows a court to achieve the desirable goal of penetrating
the self-settled spendthrift trust. Hence, the solution should be
legislative rather than judicial.
Some might disagree. Professor Warren has argued:
The treatment of spendthrift trusts can make a nice legal point
and it rightly concerns many people who hear of the debtor’s
ability to retain this kind of property, but it strains credibility to
believe that a change in the law will affect more than a handful of
people each year. It is unlikely that a substantial number of
debtors in bankruptcy are beneficiaries of trusts.127

Nonetheless, Congress should exercise its power to repair the statute
and eliminate the loophole that provides wealthy debtors with a post
discharge “head start.” As the Supreme Court has stated, “a central
purpose of the Code is to provide a procedure by which certain
insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their
creditors, and enjoy a new opportunity in life with a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt.”128 But this fresh start was intended to be limited to
the “honest but unfortunate debtor.”129
Nor was section 541(c)(2) ever intended to protect the assets of a
self-settled trust; it was designed to honor the wishes of a donor who
wanted to limit the scope of his or her gift. The spendthrift trusts the
drafters debated were the “traditional” sort—those where the settlor
is distinct from the beneficiaries. The Senate’s original proposal was
to include as property of the estate any income from the trust beyond
what was “reasonably necessary to the support of the debtor and his
dependents,”130 prompting the Commercial Law League of America to
127. Elizabeth Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy Protection for Consumers: A Response, 72
GEO. L.J. 1333, 1335 (1984).
128. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
129. Id. at 287.
130. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 83 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787. Consider
the “reasonably necessary” test some bankruptcy courts use to determine whether a debtor
is entitled to claim exemption in IRAs. Funds in IRAs may be (fully or partially) exempt if
the court determines they are “reasonably necessary” for support of debtor or debtor’s
dependents. Those courts use the following (litigation conducive) factors to make such a
determination:
(1) Debtor’s present and anticipated living expenses;
(2) Debtor’s present and anticipated income from all sources;
(3) Age of the debtor and dependents;
(4) Health of the debtor and dependents;
(5) Debtor’s ability to work and earn a living;
(6) Debtor’s job skills, training, and education;
(7) Debtor’s other assets, including exempt assets;
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complain that the language “reasonably necessary” would spawn
expensive litigation.131 The House of Representatives rejected the
Senate’s proposal, emphasizing the distinction between the
beneficiary and the settlor: “The bankruptcy of the beneficiary should
not be permitted to defeat the legitimate expectations of the settlor of
the trust.”132 The House’s distinction reveals that self-settled
spendthrift trusts were not even under consideration;133 otherwise,
this settlor-beneficiary dichotomy would not make sense. The final
result was the statute on the books today, one that renders
“traditional” spendthrift trusts untouchable by creditors in
bankruptcy; unfortunately, it has also created the possibility of selfsettled trusts being protected, despite the legislature’s intentions.
A congressional hearing concerning the interplay between ERISA
law and bankruptcy provides a strong argument for refusing
protection to self-settled trusts.134 In the hearing, the committee
emphasized the fundamental difference between a head start and a
fresh start and the unfairness of a head start:
While . . . tension [between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code]
exists when the debtor is a beneficiary of a spendthrift trust, the
lack of control the debtor has over the trust, as well as the fact
that spendthrift trusts may not be established for the benefit of the
settlor of the trust, eliminates injury to the creditors. Nothing is
being taken from the creditors. If the debtor establishes a trust in
his own benefit, however, current assets are being used to protect
the debtor’s future income. In that sense, creditors suffer an
immediate harm if they are not able to reach those assets.
Furthermore, if the debtor has no control over the assets of a
(8) Liquidity of other assets;
(9) Debtor’s ability to save for retirement;
(10) Special needs of the debtor and dependents;
(11) Debtor’s financial obligations, e.g., alimony or support payments.
In re Link, 172 B.R. 707, 710-11 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (citing In re Flygstad, 56 B.R. 884,
889-90 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986)).
131. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 & H.R. 8200 Before the
Subcomm On Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary,
95th Cong. 618 (1977) (Supplemental Statement of Commercial League).
132. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 176 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
(emphasis added). Professor Vukowich argued that “in addition to the settlor’s intent,
however, the interests of the debtor-beneficiary’s creditors certainly are relevant. The
congressional position causes an unjustified and irrational diversion of assets from
creditors to a debtor who has separate and generally ample exemption law protections,
plus a discharge of debts.” William T. Vukowich, Debtors’ Exemption Rights Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REV. 769, 777-78 (1980).
133. Cf. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 209 (1983). There the Court
noted, “[n]othing in the Bankruptcy Code or its legislative history indicates that Congress
intended a special exception for the tax collector in the form of an exclusion from the estate
of property seized to satisfy a tax lien.” Id.
134. See Consumer Issues in Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary , 102d Cong. 147
(1992).
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spendthrift trust, he or she is unable to turn the “fresh start” into
a “head start” by obtaining a discharge and then gaining access to
the entire fund.135

This committee recognized the evils of the self-settled trust well
before a small minority of states began enacting legislation
permitting self-settled trusts. It applies with equal force today.
VIII. CONCLUSION
State legislatures have recently enacted trust laws that strive to
frustrate a central purpose of the Bankruptcy Code—providing a
fresh start to the honest but unfortunate debtor.136 These laws
purportedly permit a debtor to obtain a discharge and retain his
interest in an onshore self-settled spendthrift trust. Such laws
operate to the detriment of creditors and provide a windfall to the
debtor.137
States desiring greater tax revenues enact such laws to increase
jobs in their states. Yet only short-term gains in jobs and tax
revenues can be realized. In the long run, other state legislatures can
enact identical laws. The net result would not be an increase in jobs
or taxes, but rather a decrease in creditors’ rights.
The judiciary could prevent such laws from protecting debtors in
bankruptcy.138 A variety of mechanisms allow bankruptcy courts to
soundly reason that such laws are not “enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.”139 Their reasoning could run the gamut from the
policy of the Bankruptcy Code to the policy of trust law in general. In
contrast, bankruptcy courts could also find it unpalatable to preempt
state legislation when section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code can
be read to exclude self-settled spendthrift trusts from property of the
estate. The judiciary should not be forced to choose between the
lesser of two evils, but if it must, bankruptcy concerns should
outweigh outdated language preventing the trusts from being
considered property of the estate. The responsibility for change and
the power to change both exist within the halls of Congress. Without
delay, Congress should prevent debtors from obtaining discharges
while retaining interests in self-settled spendthrift trusts. Such
legislation would eliminate a significant loophole unavailable to the
less affluent.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. See supra Part V.A-B.
137. See supra Part IV. Nonetheless, fraudulent conveyance law may be available to
some creditors.
138. One commentator raises the interesting issue whether an attorney may be subject
to personal liability for establishing an asset-protection trust. See Eric Henzy, Offshore
and “Other” Shore Asset Protection Trusts, 32 VAND. J. TRANSAT’L L. 739, 760 (1999).
139. 11 U.S.C. 541(c)(2) (1994).
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